Central Asian Migrants Face Harsh Realities in Russian Army Amid Ongoing Conflict.
Moscow’s Heavy Toll
Two and a half years into the full-scale war in Ukraine, Moscow’s forces have suffered severe losses. Reports suggest up to 500,000 Russian soldiers—about 2% of Russian men aged 20 to 50—have been killed or injured. The dire conditions at the front, where poorly trained troops with inadequate equipment are sent into battle, are widely discussed on Russian social media. The dreaded enlistment paper, or povestka, has become synonymous with a death sentence.
Despite these setbacks, Moscow continues to recruit soldiers through various means. While replenishing its ranks is challenging, replacing equipment remains a more pressing issue. The Russian army still maintains a notable manpower advantage over Ukrainian forces. Moscow’s recruitment strategy now includes a mix of historical imperial tactics and modern global capitalism, making military service an appealing option for many foreigners.
Foreign Soldiers in the Russian Ranks
Russia has traditionally attracted Central Asian migrants, with up to five million currently residing in the country—far more than the 1.3 million in Germany. This trend dates back to the Soviet era, when Central Asians served in various conflicts under Soviet rule. Historically, Central Asian soldiers faced higher casualties than their Russian counterparts, a fact often omitted from modern Russian propaganda.
Since gaining independence in 1991, Central Asian nations were not involved in Russia’s conflicts in Chechnya and Georgia. However, since February 2022, Moscow has increasingly relied on Central Asian migrants to bolster its forces. Migrants who arrived at the start of the full-scale invasion were immediately targeted for enlistment, often with limited legal recourse.
Recruitment Challenges and Strategies
Foreign recruits generally face fewer political complications than Russian conscripts. The Kremlin’s mass mobilization in September 2022 caused unrest among Moscow and St. Petersburg residents, leading to a surge in the recruitment of Central Asians. Migrants are often rounded up and sent to the front lines, where they face significant risks.
Russian propaganda frames the war as an ethnonationalist mission to reunite with Ukrainian “brothers” and combat Western values. In contrast, ethnic minorities, particularly Muslims from Central Asia, bear the brunt of the conflict. Despite this, Central Asian migrants continue to arrive in Russia and enlist in the military.
Motivations for Enlistmen
The primary motivation for Central Asians to join the Russian army is financial. Moscow offers volunteers more than $2,000 a month—a substantial sum compared to the average salary in Kyrgyzstan, which is under $400. While this offer is tempting, there are often delays or failures in payment.
Moreover, Moscow promises an accelerated path to Russian citizenship for volunteers, which has become increasingly accessible. This offer of citizenship and long-term economic security is a significant draw for many.
Impact and Future Outlook
It is difficult to gauge the exact effectiveness of these recruitment tactics as Moscow does not release official statistics on its army. However, evidence suggests that many Central Asians, whether by force or choice, are joining the Russian military. Hundreds have died, yet many more continue to arrive.
This new form of capitalist imperialism mirrors the old Soviet system but is adapted to modern global dynamics. While the Soviet era tightly controlled migration, today’s globalism allows for greater mobility. Russia’s recruitment tactics exploit Central Asian migrants as both soldiers and economic migrants. In Europe, migration offers opportunities for cheap labor; in Russia, it provides necessary manpower for the ongoing conflict.
Ironically, Central Asia is also experiencing an influx of Russian migrants, including educated and wealthy individuals setting up businesses in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. This shift is draining Russia of its young talent while increasing Central Asian resentment.
As Central Asian governments and societies become more disillusioned with the Kremlin, there is growing anti-Russian sentiment. Many young migrants may prefer to return home rather than remain in Russia. In the future, this shift could lead Central Asia to reject both Russian influence and the allure of Moscow as an immigration destination.
